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CASENOTE
Young v. Commissioner, 240 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2001).
The Assignment of Income Doctrine and Section 1041 As Applied to
Attorneys' Contingent Fees in Transfers Incident to Divorce:
A One-Two Punch to Stun the Recognition of Gain
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently there is a divide between the circuits as to whether to
treat attorneys' contingent fees as gross income to the client under the
assignment of income doctrine.' Recently, in Young v. Commis-
sioner,' the Fourth Circuit decided that the assignment of income
doctrine does apply to attorneys' contingent fees and that clients must
include in gross income amounts paid to their attorneys as contingent
fees. Specifically, in Young the Fourth Circuit decided to apply the
assignment of income doctrine to attorneys' fees in cases where the
remainder of the amount paid as a result of the legal services could be
deferred, if not eventually excluded, from gross income. This Note
will discuss this last issue, and how if the Fourth Circuit continues to
apply assignment of income to attorneys' fees in divorce cases but al-
lows a taxpayer to defer other amounts as being transfers "incident to
divorce", 3 a taxpayer could develop an argument for at least deferring
attorneys' fees from gross income, if not totally excluding them, with-
out running into assignment of income doctrine problems.
Louise Young and John Young married in 1969 and divorced in
1988. In 1989 they entered into an agreement to resolve their prop-
erty claims and all other claims arising out of the marital relationship.4
Under the terms of the agreement, Mr. Young delivered to Mrs.
Young a promissory note for $1.5 million, secured by a deed of trust
on 71 acres of property Mr. Young received as part of the agreement.5
In 1990, after Mr. Young defaulted on his obligations under the 1989
agreement, Mrs. Young brought a collection action against him in
1. See Thad Austin Davis, In Memoriam: Frank M. Johnson, Jr.: Cotnam v. Commissioner
and the Income Tax Treatment of Contingency-based Attorney's Fees-The Alabama Attorney's
Charging Lien Meets Lucas v. Earl Head-on, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1683 (2000).
2. 240 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2001).
3. See 26 U.S.C. §1041 (2001).
4. Id. at 372 (4th Cir. 2001).
5. Id.
1
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State court in North Carolina.6 The court entered judgment in favor
of Mrs. Young, awarding her principal, interest, and reasonable attor-
neys' fees.7 Mr. Young failed to fully satisfy the judgment, and Mrs.
Young took steps to execute the judgment.8
In 1992, before execution of the judgment, Mr. and Mrs. Young en-
tered into a Settlement Agreement and Release.9 The terms of this
1992 agreement provide that Mr. Young transfer to Mrs. Young 59
acres of land in return for full settlement of his obligation, approxi-
mately 42 acres of which was part of the 71 acres used as collateral for
the promissory note in 1989.10 Under the 1992 agreement, Mr. Young
had an option to repurchase the land for $2.2 million before Decem-
ber 1992.11 Mr. Young assigned this option to a third party who
bought the land from Mrs. Young for $2.2 million.12
Mrs. Young did not report as income any of the $2.2 million on her
federal income tax returns for 1992 or 1993, of which $300,606 was
paid in attorneys' fees. 3 Also, Mr. Young did not report any gain
from his transfer of the property, although his basis was only $130,794
and the property had a fair market value of $2.2 million, as evidenced
by its sale to a third party for $2.2 million.14
The Commissioner asserted deficiencies against both Mr. Young
and Mrs. Young.15 The cases were consolidated in Tax Court, and the
Tax Court ruled that the capital gain from the sale of the property to
the third party was taxable to Mrs. Young, because the 1992 agree-
ment was a transfer "incident to divorce" under 26 U.S.C. §1041.16
Therefore, Mrs. Young took Mr. Young's adjusted basis in the land
($130,794), and thus had a capital gain upon its sale for $2.2 million. 7
Mrs. Young appealed the decision, as did her second husband, to
whom she was married in 1992 and who therefore owed the money
with Mrs. Young. 8
This Note examines whether attorneys' fees paid directly to an at-
torney as a result of payment that is part of a transfer of property
"incident" to divorce should be included in the gross income of the
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 373.
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client. To fully address this issue, this Note will first examine the as-
signment of income doctrine as courts have applied it to attorneys'
fees, and then to 26 U.S.C. §1041, which excludes gain or loss from
transfers to a former spouse when the transfer is incident to divorce.' 9
Though the court in Young applied both of these laws, Mrs. Young,
the client, missed out on the significant benefit of choosing when to
pay her taxes, or perhaps being able to avoid the tax liability
altogether.
II. BACKGROUND
a. The Assignment of Income Doctrine and Attorneys' Fees
The most notable case concerning the assignment of income doc-
trine is Lucas v. Earl.2 0 In this case, a husband and wife entered into a
contract to equally divide all income received by either spouse
throughout the marriage.2' Although the Supreme Court held the
contract was valid under California law, 22 it nevertheless concluded
that a "reasonable construction of the taxing act left no doubt that the
statute could tax salaries to those who earned them, and provided that
the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and con-
tracts. '23 The Court further stated that the agreement, no matter
"however skilfully[sic] devised" could "prevent the salary when paid
from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it."'24 The
Court ended the decision by stating, "[tlhat seems to us the import of
the statute before us and we think that no distinction can be taken
according to the motives leading to the arrangement by which the
fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they
grew."
'25
The Court has followed the "fruit and tree" analogy and the assign-
ment of income doctrine numerous times since. 6
The assignment of income doctrine has been examined with respect
to attorneys' fees, and most Circuits have decided that the assignment
of income doctrine does apply to attorneys' fees, and that they are
therefore part of the client's gross income. However, the Fifth Circuit
19. 26 U.S.C §1041(a)(2) (2001).
20. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
21. Id. at 113.
22. Id. at 114.
23. Id. at 114-5.
24. Id. at 115.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122
(1940).
3
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created an exception to the assignment of income doctrine in Cotnam
v. Commissioner.27
In Cotnam, Mrs. Cotnam sued the estate of a man with whom she
had contracted to receive one-fifth of his estate upon the man's death
in return for serving as his attendant and friend. 28 Mrs. Cotnam pre-
vailed, and the court held that the 40% of the judgment used to pay
Mrs. Cotnam's attorneys was not to be included in Mrs. Cotnam's
gross income. 29 A majority of the court in Cotnam concluded that
because Alabama law provided "the same right and power over said
suits, judgments, and decrees.., as their clients had,"3 Mrs. Cotnam
was not required to include the amount paid to her attorneys in her
gross income. Mrs. Cotnam "could never have collected anything or
have enjoyed any economic benefit unless she had employed attor-
neys, and to do so, she had to part with forty per cent of her claim
long before the realization of any income from it."31
The Fifth Circuit followed the decision Cotnam in Srivastava v.
Commissioner,3 2 where the portion of the judgment of a defamation
case, which was paid to the attorneys in the case, was excluded from
the clients gross income. 33 The court acknowledges the Circuit split
on the issue of attorneys' fees as gross income under the assignment of
income doctrine, but nevertheless states that Cotnam was "substan-
tially indistinguishable" from Srivastava, and therefore the exclusion
was necessary.34
While the Eleventh Circuit has followed Cotnam as precedent due
to the split of the Fifth Circuit,35 only the Sixth Circuit has followed
Cotnam on its own in Estate of Clarks v. United States.36 In Estate of
Clarks, the decedent's estate sought a refund for taxes paid on inter-
est which accrued against a personal injury judgment for decedent,
where the interest was paid by the judgment debtor directly to the
attorney as part of a contingent fee agreement.37 The court found that
because "Michigan law operates in more or less the same way as the
Alabama lien in Cotnam," the attorneys' fees received by the dece-
dent were not required to be included in his gross income.38
27. Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F2d. 119 (5th Cir. 1959).
28. Id. at 120.
29. Id. at 125.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 126.
32. Srivatstava v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000).
33. Id. at 357.
34. Id. at 357-8.
35. See Davis v. Commissioner, 210 F.3d 1346, 1347 (11th Cir. 2000).
36. Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000).
37. Id. at 855.
38. Id. at 856.
4
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Taxpayers in other circuits must incur the full weight of the assign-
ment of income doctrine when it comes to attorneys' fees. In the
Ninth Circuit case of Coady v. Commissioner,39 Mrs. Coady won a
wrongful termination suit, recovered a judgment for back pay and
benefits, then paid her attorneys' fees and litigation costs from this
amount.4" The Coady court distinguishes Cotnam on the facts, and
then explains its decision in detail which would lead one to believe it
would not follow Cotnam even if the facts were exactly the same.4
In Kenseth v. Commissioner,4" the Seventh Circuit also refused to
exclude attorneys' fees from gross income. The court in Kenseth not
only concluded that Mr. Kenseth had to include his attorneys' fees in
his gross income, but took the opportunity to rebuke the circuits
which continue to uphold Cotnam.43
b. Transfers Incident to Divorce Under 26 U.S.C. §1041
The second major portion of the law that should be considered
when looking at Young44 is 26 U.S.C. §1041(a)(2), which states "[n]o
gain or loss shall be recognized on a transfer of property from an indi-
vidual to... a former spouse, but only if the transfer is incident to the
divorce."45 This statute was enacted in 1984 in reaction to United
States v. Davis,46 in which the Supreme Court ruled that a divorce
transfer in return for a release of inchoate marital claims was a taxable
event to the transferor, thus triggering gain or loss. Several problems
arose from this treatment, such as the transferor spouse not having
any cash with which to pay the tax generated, the amount of basis the
transferee spouse took, and widespread unreport of the "Davis" in-
come.47 By passing 26 U.S.C. §1041, Congress allowed such problems
to be avoided by making the Davis-type transfers a non-tax event.
One significant benefit was created with the enactment of 26 U.S.C.
§1041 as well: it allows the transferee spouse to control when he or she
wishes to incur the tax on the property, by making a decision as to
when to sell the property (or to partake in some other recognition
39. Cody v. C.I.R., 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
40. Id. at 1188.
41. See id. at 1190-1.
42. Kenseth v. Commissioner, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
43. For instance, statements such as, "Indeed the cases that reject the Tax Court's position
seem based on little more than sympathy for taxpayers," "It is often the case that to obtain
income from an asset one must hire a skilled agent and pay him up front," and finally,
"Enough." Id. at 885.
44. Young v. Commissioner, 240 F.3d 369 (2001).
45. 26 U.S.C. §1041(a)(2) (2000).
46. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
47. For a critique of the I.R.S. position on Section 1041 and the assignment of income doc-
trine, see Walter H. Nunnelly, The Assignment of Income Doctrine as Applied to Section 1041
Divorce Transfers: How the Service Got It Wrong, 68 ORE. L. REV. 615 (1989).
5
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event with respect to the property). It is this benefit that disappears in
Young.
III. BACKGROUND
In Young, the Fourth Circuit had to decide to treat the 1992 settle-
ment agreement reached by the Youngs as a transfer "incident to di-
vorce" under 26 U.S.C. §1041.48 The majority looked to the Treasury
Regulations to determine whether a transfer was incident to divorce.49
The Treasury Regulations state that a transfer can be "incident" to
divorce if it is "made within six years of divorce" if also "pursuant to a
divorce or separation instrument, as defined in § 71(b)(2). 5 ° Using
this test, the majority concluded that the 1992 agreement was made
within 6 years of the 1988 divorce and was a proper instrument under
§71(b)(2), and so was "incident to divorce" and fell under 26 U.S.C.
§1041. The effect of this was that Mrs. Young had to include $2.2
million for the sale of the land in her gross income.51
Even though the sale of the land produced gross income to Mrs.
Young, she argued that the money paid to her attorneys should be
excluded from gross income, and asked the court to adopt the decision
in Cotnam.52 The court unanimously agreed not to do so, and held
that the assignment of income doctrine compelled Mrs. Young to in-
clude in her gross income the amount paid to her attorneys. 53 In do-
ing so, the court explicitly rejected Cotnam, but stated that even if it
followed the reasoning of Cotnam, North Carolina law is different
from Alabama law in regard to attorneys' right to fees, and Mrs.
Young would still have to include her attorneys' fees in gross
income.54
IV. ANALYSIS
In Young, the taxpayer, Mrs. Young, is involved in a transaction,
which falls under 26 U.S.C. §1041, 55 or so the majority would have one
believe, but if this transaction were truly under 26 U.S.C. §1041, Mrs.
Young would have the opportunity to realize the benefit described in
the paragraph above; that is, to recognize the gain when she chose to
recognize it. Because she had hired attorneys to assist her, she had to
immediately report the amount paid to her attorneys for fees and ex-
48. Young v. Commissioner, 240 F.3d 369, 373 (4th Cir. 2001).
49. Id.
50. Id. (quoting TEMP. TREAS. REG. § 1.1041-iT(b) (2000)).
51. Id. at 376.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 379.
55. Id. at 376.
2002]
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penses.56 She could not defer the gain included in the attorneys' fees,
and therefore 26 U.S.C. §1041 was not given full effect in Young.
Consider two contrasting scenarios to illustrate the point. In the
first scenario, Taxpayer A represents herself in obtaining an agree-
ment under the same circumstances as the 1992 agreement in Young,
and therefore has to pay no attorneys' fees. Under the ruling in
Young, the transfer is still under 26 U.S.C. §1041 and therefore is a
non-recognition event. Since this would be the case, Taxpayer A's ex-
spouse would recognize no gain or loss upon the transfer, and never
again have to worry about gain or loss from the property. Taxpayer A
would still have to recognize gain or loss, but this gain or loss would
only be recognized at some point in the future; a point that Taxpayer
A could choose. Indeed Taxpayer A could choose never to recognize
the gain by giving the property away during her lifetime, giving the
donee her basis.57 Taxpayer A could even utilize the ultimate tax
strategy: death. Her testamentary gift would allow the beneficiary to
take a step-up basis in the property, not Taxpayer A's previously un-
recognized gain from the 26 U.S.C. §1041 transfer.5"
Now consider a second scenario. In this scenario, Taxpayer B must
enlist the help of attorneys in obtaining an agreement under the same
circumstances as the 1992 agreement in Young. The attorneys will do
so only in return for a fee.5 9 The fee will be due once the services are
rendered, and in the case of a contingent fee will be determined and
also due at the time of settlement. If Taxpayer B settles for $2.2 mil-
lion in real property, as was the case in Young,6" but then chooses not
to sell the land, the contingency fees of the attorneys are still immedi-
ately due. Thus, whatever percentage of the settlement is paid to the
attorneys represents that same percentage of gain in the land but it is
not eligible for deferral, as it would be if Taxpayer B had been repre-
61sented pro se.
Suppose now that Taxpayer B, who was represented by attorneys
and paid attorneys' fees out of the settlement, wishes to defer the gain
that was represented in the land. Looking back at the two scenarios
we see that she could not. Here is where the assignment of income
56. Id. at 379.
57. See 26 U.S.C. §102 (2001).
58. See 26 U.S.C. §1015 (2001).
59. The author understands there may be extremely rare cases where an attorney will take a
$2.2 million case pro bono, but nevertheless is playing the odds for this illustration.
60. Since Mr. Young retained an option to repurchase the land for $2.2 million and then the
land was actually sold for this amount, it must be assumed this is the Fair Market Value of the
land, and therefore the value of the 1992 agreement.
61. The author realizes that in Young, Mrs. Young immediately sold the land and therefore
would have recognized her gain even if she had been represented pro se.
7
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doctrine does not square with the application of 26 U.S.C. §1041 in
Young.
The Fourth Circuit court uses the assignment of income doctrine to
force Mrs. Young to include in her gross income the amount paid di-
rectly to her attorneys.62 But what if our Taxpayer B decides to use
some tax cunning, and claim that the attorneys' fees paid were not
truly a portion of the settlement proceeds, but merely paid out of Tax-
payer B's pocket in an amount equal to the proceeds. Taxpayer B
could then claim the entire amount of the settlement fell under 26
U.S.C. §1041, and therefore is unrecognizable as gain until the sale of
the property or some other recognition event. Generally, trying to
make this distinction would be futile; a taxpayer would have to recog-
nize income from whatever source derived.63 But when a non-recog-
nition statute such as 26 U.S.C. §1041 is in place, it is in the taxpayer's
interest to make an argument like this. Under the now famous "fruit-
tree" analysis in Lucas v. Earl,64 Taxpayer B would have kept both the
trees and the fruit from the divorce settlement, but paid her attorneys
with fruit from trees in a completely different orchard.65
Taxpayer B may have some artillery for this argument supplied, per-
haps accidentally, by the majority in Young. The majority states,
"[t]he client still controls the claim (or property)" and "[t]he attorney
simply provides a service and receives compensation. ' 66 The majority
further states, "to allow her to escape taxation on a portion of the
settlement proceeds simply because she arranged to compensate her
attorneys directly from the proceeds through a contingent fee arrange-
ment."67 The "directly from the proceeds" language would allow our
Taxpayer B, if able to win a well-crafted argument that her attorneys'
fees were paid out of other funds ("fruit"), to avoid the assignment of
income doctrine as it was applied in Young, and to keep from recog-
nizing the gain until such time as Taxpayer B chose to partake in a
recognition event. It was even stated in Young that
The policy animating § 1041 is clear. Congress has chosen to "treat a
husband and wife [and former husband and wife acting incident to
divorce] as one economic unit, and to defer, but not eliminate, the
recognition of any gain or loss on interspousal property transfers until
the property is conveyed to a third party outside the economic unit. "68
62. Young v. Commissioner, 240 F.3d 369, 379 (4th Cir. 2001).
63. 26 U.S.C. §61 (2001).
64. Supra, p.2.
65. For a discussion on this topic, see Lauren E. Sheridan, Note: Trees In The Orchard Or
Fruit From The Trees: The Case For Excluding Attorneys' Contingent Fees From Client's Gross
Income, 36 GA. L. REv. 283 (2001).
66. Young at 378.
67. Id. at 377-8.
68. Id. at 375. (quoting Blatt v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 77, 80 (1994)).
2002]
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The Internal Revenue Service, however, is not so quick to allow a
taxpayer to circumvent the assignment of income doctrine, no matter
how legitimate the means may be. Revenue Ruling 87-112 is just such
an example. 69 It states "deferred, accrued interest on U.S. savings
bonds is includible in the transferor's gross income in the taxable year
in which the transferor transfers the bonds to the transferor's spouse
or former spouse in a transfer described in section 1041(a) of the
Code."' 7° This seems contrary to the entire purpose of 26 U.S.C. §1041
as discussed earlier."1 However it is clearly the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice position that 26 U.S.C. §1041 "does not shield from recognition
income that is ordinarily recognized upon the assignment of that in-
come to another taxpayer. "72
If this harsh treatment of certain types of transfers that would nor-
mally not be recognized under 26 U.S.C. §1041 was in fact an instance
where the Internal Revenue Service "got it wrong, ' 73 then did the
Fourth Circuit also get it wrong by creating a rule by which income
that, without attorneys' fees being deducted, would have been de-
ferred? If one applies consistently the assignment of income doctrine
and 26 U.S.C. §1041 as it is used in Young, it is only logical to allow
Taxpayer B to prevail on an argument for deferring the attorneys' fees
portion from gross income, even if she is not allowed to exclude them
altogether. Unfortunately, logic sometimes not only takes a back seat,
but can be locked in the trunk, as the tax machine speeds down the
highway.
V. CONCLUSION
Admittedly, this new approach to looking at the assignment of in-
come doctrine in cases where the transfer is also deemed "incident" to
divorce will be of little benefit to Mrs. Young. Her sale of the land to
a third party via Mr. Young's option to repurchase 74 caused the imme-
diate trigger of any gain she wished to defer. However, now that tax-
payers know they will receive treatment under 26 U.S.C. §1041 when
agreements are reached like those entered into by Mrs. Young, they
should be able to defer any gain included in the attorneys' fees paid by
their spouse until the realization of the rest of the gain - which, in
the case of a gift or devise, would be never. To apply both the assign-
69. REV. RUL. 87-112, 1987-2 C.B. 207.
70. Id.
71. Supra at 4.
72. REV. RUL. 87-112, 1987-2 C.B. 207.
73. See note 44, supra.
74. Young, 240 F.3d at 372.
9
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ment of income doctrine and 26 U.S.C. §1041 in the way the majority
did in Young can produce no other logical result.
CHAD STOOP
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